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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

Baseline Farms Two, LLP v. Hennings, 26 P.3d 1209 (Colo. Ct. App.
2001) (holding no immediate and irreparable injury was shown, and,
thus, the motion for preliminary injunction failed).
Baseline Farms Two, LLP ("Baseline Farms") appealed to Adams
County District Court to contest the dismissal of its motion for
preliminary injunction against Steven and Chris Hennings
("Hennings"). Baseline Farms sought to bar the Hennings from
discharging wastewater onto their property. Baseline Farms sued for
slander of tile, trespass, improper lien, and nuisance abatement.
The Hennings owned a campground across the street from the
Baseline Farms property. Developing Equities Group ("DEG") sought
to develop the Baseline Farms property into a residential area. The
Hennings' campground had a licensed wastewater treatment facility
that flowed underneath the street and onto the land owned by
Baseline Farms. The Hennings claimed a prescriptive easement
allowed their wastewater to flow through the ditch on Baseline Farms'
property. The predecessors of both properties recognized the
easement, and the Hennings recorded it in 1998. Baseline Farms
claimed the Hennings easement must be revoked due to the health
hazard posed by the Hennings' wastewater, and the fact that the
wastewater interfered with Baseline Farms' use of their property.
Baseline Farms introduced expert testimony from an
environmental engineer to illustrate the need for a preliminary
injunction. The expert testified that on three days on which the water
was tested, it appeared to be standing still, and was in excess of
permitted levels of pollutants. In particular, the expert testified the
fecal coliform count was consistently much higher than allowed under
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment ("CDPHE")
standards.
On cross examination the expert admitted that with the aid of
ground and surface water, the water in question could be put into
motion. Also, the expert admitted, since CDPHE standards are to be
measured over thirty day averages, to characterize the quality levels
here based on three days of data would be inaccurate. Finally, the
expert admitted contaminants might be entering the ditch from other
sources.
The Hennings' cross-examination of Baseline Farms' expert
helped establish the testimony as inconclusive as to the correct
operation of the wastewater treatment plant. The Hennings also
pointed out Baseline Farms refused their request to enter Baseline
Farms' land to clean out the ditch, which Baseline Farms had never
done in the ten years it has owned the property. Baseline Farms also
revealed that no impact on DEG's plans for development would result
for at least one year.
Following the presentation of Henning's evidence, the court
granted their motion to dismiss Baseline Farm's case. The court held
Baseline Farms had failed to show a real, immediate, and irreparable
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injury. Baseline Farms asserted this legal standard was inapplicable
where private parties were acting as private attorneys to enforce state
water and health control standards.
The court disagreed, holding that the applicable water quality
statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-8-611 and 25-8-612, did not specifically
dispense with the irreparable injury requirement and that this case did
not involve an action undertaken by a government agency pursuant to
a special statutory procedure. The articles here were not intended to
create new rights or to enlarge existing private rights. The provisions
of the articles also did not authorize injunctions or create a private
cause of action to proceed in the public interest. The articles did
recognize, however, that no private rights have been lost by enactment
of the Water Quality Control Act, and water violation determination
should not benefit anyone other than the state. Through this statutory
analysis, it was clear that based on the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, there must be a showing of a real, irreparable injury in
order to support a preliminary injunction. Thus, this court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the case.
MichaelSheehan

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Jubilee Hous., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 774
A.2d 281 (D.C. 2001) (holding the Water and Sewer Authority was not
exempt from following the specific statutory requirement that all rate
changes be preceded by notice and public hearing).
Jubilee Housing, Inc. ("Jubilee"), a non-profit housing
organization, brought this action against the District of Columbia
Water and Sewer Authority ("Authority") following the Authority's
termination of preferential water rates for non-profit housing
organizations. The Authority did not provide a public hearing and
only provided notice to some, but not all, organizations affected by the
termination.
Under section 43-1686 (a) and (b) of the District of Columbia
Code ("DCC"), the Authority was allowed to collect and abate fees and
establish and adjust retail water and sewer rates "following notice and
public hearing." The only issue the Authority raised in defense was
whether the temporary termination of preferential water rates
constituted "establishing" water and sewer rates for purposes of
section 43-1686 (b) of the DCC.
The court held that the termination of the preferential rates did
constitute establishing water and sewer rates under the code and
therefore, the Authority was required to provide notice and public
hearing prior to the termination of the rates. The court reasoned that
the termination of the rates would impose a new obligation on Jubilee

